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I think Miranda has been very salutary for certain people in our
community... [Miranda] has had a great effect, particularly on the mi-
nority community. Just the fact they are told they have a right to remain
silent, a right to have an attorney represent them, and a right not to
make any statements until they have an attorney present, and there's
nothing the police can do to stop it, has had an effect in some circum-
stances .... We're talking about a sense of command: a person accused
of a crime having the sense she is treated as a human being as a result of
this decision by the Supreme Court. I think there is a feeling of fairness
that many minority people never felt before they received these
[Miranda] rights.1
. Professor, California Western School of Law. BA. 1977, McGill University; J.D.
1980, Boston University. An edited version of this article appears in the forthcoming
book, Cultural Issues in Criminal Defense, published byJuris Publishing. The book can
be obtained by calling the publisher at (800) 887-4064, or visiting the website at
www.jurispub.com. Special thanks to Rene Valladares, James Connell III, Mark
Broida, Sandy Murray, and Lisa Stepp for their invaluable assistance with this project.
'Judge Norma Holloway Johnson, Symposium, Liberty and Security: A Contemporary
Perspective on the "Criminal Justice Revolution" of the 1960s, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TmR
ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW RESOURCE CENTER, DRAKE UNIVERSITY




A. THE ADVENT OF MIRANDA
In 1966, the Supreme Court issued one of its most signifi-
cant rulings2 when it decided the case of Miranda v. Arizona.
Recognizing that police officers often use sophisticated and de-
vious techniques4 to extract confessions5 from vulnerable sus-
pects, 6 the Court for the first time explicitly relied on the Fifth
Amendment privilege7 against self-incrimination 8 to provide
protection for individuals subjected to custodial interrogation. 9
Extending the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege
from the courtroom to the police station,"0 the Court ruled that
to safeguard a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination and
to dispel the compulsion in the inherently coercive environ-
2 The decision is not without its critics. See, e.g., Paul Cassell & Richard Fowles,
Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty Year Perspective on Miranda s Harmful Effects on Law En-
forcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998); Paul G. Cassell, The Costs of the Miranda Man-
date: A Lesson in the Dangers of Inleible, 'Prophylactic" Supreme Court Inventions, 28 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 299 (1996); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996); Joseph Grano, SYMrosIuM OI" Ti CONSTITuTONAL LAW
RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 1, at 109.
' 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4 The Court acknowledged that police had moved away from physically coercive to
psychologically coercive means of extracting confessions from suspects. See id. at 448.
The Court referenced police manuals that outline various tactics police could use to
obtain statements during interrogation. These tactics included removing the suspect
from familiar surroundings, keeping the interrogation private, and keeping the sus-
pect away from anyone or anything that might give him moral support or confidence.
See id. at 449-50. Further, the interrogating officer was instructed to presume guilt,
and merely interrogate as to the reasons for the commission of the crime. See id. at
450. Through patience and perseverance, the police officer was encouraged to fulfill
his goal of attaining a confession. See id. at 450-51. The manuals suggested use of the
"good cop/bad cop" routine as another means of attaining a confession. See id. at
452.
' Id. at 448-55.
'For example, Miranda himself was an "indigent Mexican" who was "seriously dis-
turbed." Id. at 457.
, The Supreme Court refers to the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination either as a "right" or a "privilege." Therefore, I will do the same in this
article.
8 "No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.10Id. at 461-67.
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ment of custodial interrogation," a police officer must warn
every suspect that he has a right to silence and a right to an at-
torney before subjecting him to custodial questioning. 2 Unless
the suspect knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives these
rights, 3 his statements cannot be used against him at trial.
4
The Miranda decision was significant for a number of rea-
sons. It openly recognized the inherent coercion of incommu-
nicado police interrogation. 15 It acknowledged that police
officers use sophisticated psychological ploys to encourage sus-
pects to confess. 6 For the first time, it explicitly turned to the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 7 rather
than the Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment right to due process' 8 or
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 9 to protect a suspect
subjected to custodial interrogation.20 Finally, it rejected a case-
by-case approach2' to evaluating confessions. Instead the Court
" Id. at 467.
2 Id. at 444. ("Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed.").
Id. at 444.
'4 Id. at 479. In Harris v. New York, however, the Court ruled that even if a police
officer violates Miranda, as long as the defendant's statements were made voluntarily,
those statements may still be used to impeach the defendant at trial. 401 U.S. 222,
225-26 (1971).
"Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456-58.
I61d. at 448. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17Id. at 458-61.
"8 "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Beginning with Brown v. Mississippi the Supreme Court began relying upon the due
process clause to protect suspects from custodial interrogation. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
" "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court found
that denying the defendant's right to counsel undermined his ability to exercise his
privilege against self-incrimination. 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964).
0 justice Harlan, in his dissent, found that the due process clause was still a reli-
able basis for evaluating confessions. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 506-09 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing).
" For examples of the case-by-case approach see Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
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promulgated a standardized set of warnings that police officers
were required to give suspects before subjecting them to custo-
dial interrogation. 23
B. CULTURAL CHANGES IN THE UNITED STATES
At the same time that the Court was shifting its perspective
on the admissibility of confessions, the Legislature was shifting
its perspective on immigration. In October of 1965, Congress
passed the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,4 which
eliminated previous national origin quotas.25 Additionally, it
eliminated the "long-standing official discrimination against
prospective immigrants from the so-called Asia-Pacific trian-
gle. 26 Instead, it set a worldwide annual ceiling of 290,000 for
legal immigration-170,000 per year for immigrants from the
27
Eastern Hemisphere, and 120,000 for immigrants from the
Western Hemisphere.2 ' The Government enacted a first-come,
first-served basis to admit immigrants.2 Applications from im-
mediate relatives of U.S. citizens were not included in the an-
nual ceilings.3s
(1949); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69.
2Id. at 469-70.
24 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1999). This legislation sought to achieve five basic goals: "1. to
provide for family reunification; 2. to attract skilled and educated aliens; 3. to ease
world population problems caused by natural disasters and political unrest; 4. to en-
courage international exchange programs; and 5. to prevent the entry of aliens with
health problems, criminal records or the indigent." JuAN L. GONZALES, RACIAL AND
ETHNIC GROUPS INAMERICA 86 (1996).
2PHLIP Q. YANG, Posr-1965 IMhIGRATON TO ThE UNITED STATES 15 (1995). For
approximately 40 years, the United States sanctioned a national origins quota system
that favored white immigrants, mostly from Northern Europe. In this way, the Gov-
ernment sought to maintain the ethnic composition of this country. SANFORD J.
UNGAR, FRESH BLOOD 100 (1995).
2 UNGAR, supra note 25, at 102.
Additionally, Congress set an annual maximum of 20,000 immigrants from each
country in the Eastern Hemisphere. No such maximum was set for countries from







As the United States was deluged with applications for im-
migration, the Government continued to reform its immigra-
tion policies. For example, in 1976, Congress extended the
annual ceiling by 20,000 immigrants from Western Hemisphere
countries.' In 1980, it reduced the annual ceiling of immi-
grants to 270,00032 but established a distinct policy and category
for refugees. It expanded the definition of "refugee" and set a
separate worldwide annual ceiling of 50,000 for this category.
33
During the period of 1960 to 1990, the immigration of
refugees deeply affected the composition of this country's popu-
lation. For instance, between 1960 and 1980, the Government
admitted more than 800,000 Cuban refugees into the United
States.4 Additionally, between 1975 and 1979, more than
200,000 Vietnamese immigrated to the United States after the
fall of Saigon. In all, between 1975 and 1984, more than
700,000 Indochinese refugees36 settled here.
During this period, an explosion of illegal immigration also
affected the growth and composition of the American popula-
tion. 8 Seeking to address the issue of illegal immigration, Con-
gress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act in
November of 1986.39 This legislation authorized:
amnesty and temporary resident status to all illegal aliens who had lived
in the United States continuously since January 1, 1982; imposed sanc-
tions on employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens; initiated a Special
Agricultural Worker program to prevent possible labor shortages caused




32 Commentators have noted that this ceiling became insignificant as the Govern-
ment made "exceptions for various special cases and as illegal immigration became a
more significant factor." UNGAR, supra note 25, at 102.
"YANG, supra note 25, at 16.
34 GONZALES, supra note 24, at 87.
35 Id.
7 In 1992, approximately "123,000 refugees were admitted, about half from the
former Soviet Union, a quarter from Vietnam, and most of the rest from Laos, Cuba,
Iraq and Ethiopia." UNGAR, supra note 25, at 104.
id at 102.
"8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1999).
4 YANG, supra note 25, at 16
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This legislation profoundly impacted the composition of
this country's population. For example, more than 400,000 ali-
ens applied for amnesty during the first eleven months of the
program.41 "By August of 1990, 1,300,000 aliens had applied for
legalization under the provisions of this Act and only 341 were
denied. Of these applications, 1,230,299 were Mexican nation-
als."4 2 Additionally, over a half a million aliens sought legaliza-
tion under the Special Agricultural Workers program.4 3 "During
the fiscal year of 1988, a total of 643,000 aliens were granted le-
gal status under the provisions of this Act.,
44
In sum, immigration to this country has grown significantly
since 1965. Between 1969 and 1989, in excess of 12 million
people legally immigrated into the United States. 5 Moreover,
the source of those immigrants has changed significanly.46 Be-
fore 1965, Europe provided the majority of America's immi-
grants. Since 1965, Latin America and Asia share that
distinction.47
Not surprisingly, this shift in the source of immigration has
dramatically affected American society. By 1990, "32 million
people living in the United States reported speaking a language
other than English at home and more than 40 percent of them
acknowledged that they did not speak English very well."4 In
addition to their native tongue, these immigrants also bring
with them their culture-"their sense of self-identification and
group identification, engendered by race, ethnicity, religion
4 GONZALES, supra note 24, at 87.




45 YANG, supra note 25, at 18. This number does not take into account the huge
number of individuals who have immigrated to the United States illegally. If those
numbers were included, the total figure for immigration during this period would be
significantly greater. See id.
4 According to INS records, from 1951 to 1960:
72.3 percent of newly naturalized Americans came from Europe, but for the period from
1981 to 1991, Europeans were down to 14.8 percent, and Asians represented almost half
(49.5 percent) of those becoming citizens. By 1992 more than half of those naturalized
were Asians, and Europeans represented barely an eighth of the total.
UNGAR, supra note 25, at 103.
47YANG, supra note 25, at 18.
" UNGAR, supra note 25, at 103.
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and language." 49 All these cultural attributes deeply influence
American society, and perceptions of interrogated individuals.
With this explosion in immigration, it was not long before
the courts began to address the application of Miranda to those
of different cultures. For if Miranda sought to provide protec-
tion for the vulnerable criminal suspect from the sophisticated
official interrogator, who could possibly be more vulnerable
than a suspect who does not speak English or who does not em-
brace American culture?50
II. APPLICABILITY OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
In addressing the issue of confessions and culture, it is first
necessary to determine to whom Miranda applies. Repeatedly,
the Supreme Court has explained that the Miranda warnings are
not constitutionally mandated but, instead, are a judicially-
created measure to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.5' Because the warnings are merely a
mechanism to protect the privilege against self-incrimination, it
is important to examine specifically who is covered by this con-
stitutional safeguard.
A. CITIZENS AND LAWFULLYADMITTED ALIENS
The Court has not defined the term "person" as set forth in
the Fifth Amendment.52 There is no doubt that this constitu-
" Leslie V. Dery, Disinterring the "Good" and "Bad Immigrant": A Deconstruction of the
State Court Interpreter Laws for Non-English Speaking Criminal Defendants, 45 U. KAN. L.
REv. 837, 839 (1997).
" For an interesting discussion of the interaction of criminal law and culture, see
Miles Corwin, Cultural Sensitivity on the Beat, LA. TIM:E,Jan. 10, 2000, at Al.
" New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 444 (1974)); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985) (quoting
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654). A federal statute purports to govern the admissibility of
statements in federal court, and provides that failure to provide warnings is one
among several factors in determining admissibility. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994); Davis
v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 463 (1994) (ScaliaJ., concurring); United States v. Al-
varez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994); United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 781
n.5 (6th Cir. 1997). Notwithstanding 18 U.S.C § 3501, federal courts continue to ap-
ply Miranda. Doherty, 126 F.3d at 781 n.5. This may change, however, with the Court's
upcoming decision in Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999).
52 In a case interpreting the application of the Fourteenth Amendment, however,
the Supreme Court ruled that the benefits of the Fourteenth Amendment are not
1999]
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tional provision protects a citizen of the United States who re-
sides in this country.53 It also protects a United States citizen sta-
tioned abroad.54  It covers a lawful permanent resident of the
United States who is physically present in the United States.55 It
also seems to encompass an individual who is lawfully present in
the United States under parole status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1182 (d) (5) .56 The Fifth Amendment, however, does not protect
enemy aliens outside the United States.
B. UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS
The application of the Fifth Amendment is less clear as to
those who are physically, but not lawfully, present in the United
States. In the past, the Court has held that an undocumented
limited to citizens but apply to "every citizen of the United States equally with those of
the strangers and aliens who now invoke the jurisdiction of the court." Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Extending this rationale, the Supreme Court
held in Wong Wing v. United States that the Fifth Amendment applied to all persons
within the United States, irrespective of their citizenship or alienage. 163 U.S. 228,
238 (1896).
Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238.
s Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (plurality opinion); see also Kinsella v. Sin-
gleton, 361 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1960) (extending Reid to non-capital crimes).
-" Resident aliens are "persons" under the Fifth Amendment and "are entitled to
the same protections under the Clause as citizens." United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S.
666, 671 (1998); see also Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953)
("' [O]nce an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested
with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such
rights include those protected by the... Fifth Amendment .... They extend their in-
alienable privileges to all 'persons' and guard against any encroachment on those
rights by federal or state authority."' (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161
(1945) (Murphy,J., concurring)).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5) (1999). See United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d 920,
922-23 (4th Cir. 1986) (applying right to remain silent to discretionary parolees un-
der 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d) (5)). But see United States v. Lileikis, 899 F. Supp. 802, 806 (D.
Mass. 1995) (declaring that "nonresident aliens [admitted under § 1182(d) (5)] like
the Aranetas, whose connections to the United States were transient at best, would
have only the most tenuous of claims to the Fifth Amendment privilege") (footnote
omitted).57Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950). The court defines an enemy
alien as a "subject of a foreign state at war with the United States." Id. at 769 n.2.
This is in contrast to an alien friend who is the "subject of a foreign state at peace
with the United States." Id.
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alien enjoys the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 58
In a Fourth Amendment case, however, the Court ruled that
a defendant whose home in Mexico was searched by American
and Mexican officers may not challenge the search as constitu-
tionally unreasonable. 9 The Court ruled that because the de-
fendant was a Mexican citizen who had no voluntary attachment
to the United States and the search was not conducted in this
country, he enjoyed no Fourth Amendment protection.6 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court mentioned in dicta that
"aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come
within the territory of the United States and [have] developed
substantial connections with this country."6' Thus, the Court
seemed to confirm that even if a person had entered the United
States illegally, but was present voluntarily and had "developed
substantial connections with this country," he would enjoy con-
62stitutional protection. In addition, the Court stressed that "the
Fifth Amendment ... speaks in the relatively universal term of
'person,' [as opposed to] the Fourth Amendment, which ap-
plies only to 'the people.'
6
0
Although the Supreme Court has not decided whether an
alien is protected by Miranda, every lower court that has consid-
' Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) ("Whatever his status under the immigra-
tion laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even
aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as 'per-
sons' guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.") (ci-
tations omitted).
"g See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
60 Id. at 274-75.
" Id. at 271 (citing, inter alia, Plyler, 457 U.S. at 212). Courts and commentators
have considered this statement dicta because the question of the Fourth Amendment
rights of aliens unlawfully residing in the United States was not before the Court. See
id. at 279 n.* (Stevens,J., concurring) ("[C]omment on illegal aliens' entitlement to
the protections of the Fourth Amendment [is not] necessary to resolve this case.");
United States v. Iribe, 806 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D. Colo. 1992), rev'd in part on other
grounds, affd in part, 11 F.3d 1553 (10th Cir. 1993); Rene L. Valladares & James G.
Connell, III, Search & Seizure Protections for Undocumented Aliens: The Territoriality and
Voluntary Presence Principles in Fourth Amendment Law, 34 AM. Ciam. L. REv. 1293, 1314-
15 (1997).
62 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271.
6' Id. at 269.
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ered the question has decided in favor of such protection.r For
purposes of Miranda coverage, it is irrelevant whether the alien
is at the border or within the country, or whether he is within
the United States legally or illegally.65
III. CUSTODY
Miranda warnings need only be given to individuals who are
subjected to custodial interrogation by government agents.'
The Court in Miranda found that the interplay of custody and
government interrogation is so inherently coercive that Miranda
warnings are necessary to protect the suspect's privilege against
self-incrimination. 67
A. THE MEANING OF CUSTODY
For purposes of Miranda, a suspect is in "custody" "as soon
as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associ-
ated with formal arrest."'t' In contrast, a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is defined as a "meaningful interference,
however brief, with an individual's freedom of movement."6' A
" United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1119 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing cases); Bar-
rera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1449 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 914 (5th Cir. 1979)); Henry, 604 F.2d at 914 (citing, inter alia,
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)); Pena v. Thornburgh, 770 F.
Supp. 1153, 1160 n.1 (E.D. Tex. 1991); United States v. Razzaq, 524 F. Supp. 881, 882
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing Henry, 604 F.2d at 914).
Barrera-Echavarria, 44 F.3d at 1449 (quoting Henry, 604 F.2d at 914); Rodriguez-
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1981) (citing Henry, 604
F.2d at 914); Henry, 604 F.2d at 914; Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028, 1033 (S.D.
Tex. 1984), judgment reversed in part, vacated in part, 838 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988) (cit-
ing Henry, 604 F.2d at 914).
66 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
67 Id. at 457-58.
' Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler,
463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)). Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the
Court permits a police officer to temporarily seize and briefly question an individual
based on reasonable suspicion, rather than on probable cause, to ascertain whether
the individual is involved in criminal wrongdoing and whether he poses a threat to
the police officer or to the public. Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
69 United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 n.5 (1984). "[W]henever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized'
that person." Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
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suspect is not in custody during a limited Terry stop, 7° unless the
stop limits the suspect's freedom to a degree associated with ar-
rest.'
To determine whether an individual was in custody at the
time of the interrogation, "a court must examine all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the interrogation, "72 and must analyze
"how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have un-
derstood his situation. " Custody "depends on the objective
circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views
harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person be-
ing questioned."74
There are several advantages to using this objective stan-
dard. First, it eliminates the likelihood that if a court used a
subjective test, every suspect would later testify that he subjec-
tively believed he was in custody at the time of the interroga-
tion. 5 Conversely, every police officer would testify later that he
subjectively intended to let the suspect leave if the suspect ex-
pressed a desire to do so. 6 Second, by using this objective test,
the court sets standards of conduct for law enforcement, teach-
70 A "Terry stop" derives from the Supreme Court case of Teny v. Ohio, where the
Court found that a police officer, with reasonable suspicion, may "stop and frisk" a
suspect for weapons. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). This is permissible, even if the officer
does not have probable cause to arrest the suspect for a crime. Id.
7, See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440; United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463-64 (10th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1097-98 (7th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Goodridge, 945 F. Supp. 359, 365 (D. Mass. 1996). For an interesting discussion of
this issue, see Thomas Gerry Bufkin, Terry and Miranda: The Conflict Between the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 18 Mrss. C. L. REv. 199 (1997);
Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63
FORDHAM L. REv. 715 (1994); Note, Custodial Engineering: Cleaning Up the Scope of
Miranda Custody During Coercive Terry Stops, 108 HAIrv. L. REv. 665 (1995).
2 Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam) (citing Beheler,
463 U.S. at 1125).
75 Id. at 324 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 (quotations omitted)).
7' Id. at 323. At least one court has held that a person confined at an Immigration
and Naturalization Service detention center is in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
See United States v. Cadmus, 614 F. Supp. 367, 372-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
7' Richard A. Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop" and "Ar-
rest," 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 771, 790 (1982), citing WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARcH & SEZuRE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.2 (g), at 52 (1978).76 Williamson, supra note 75, at 790.
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ing police officers under what circumstances "custody" occurs.77
This eliminates the need for police officers to make spontane-
ous judgments about either their own conduct or about the psy-
chological or cultural idiosyncracies of the suspect whom they
are questioning. 8 Courts prefer this objective approach because
it "avoids imposing upon police officers the often impossible
burden of predicting whether the person they question, because
of characteristics peculiar to him, believes himself to be re-
strained.
79
On the other hand, commentators argue that using the ob-
jective standard merely serves to maintain the power80 of the
dominant culture.8 ' Because objective standards generally re-
flect the values of the dominant culture, judgments under those
standards benefit that group and disadvantage minority cul-
tures.82 By referring to the mythical "objectively reasonable per-
son," courts fail to acknowledge that persons of different
cultures sometimes think or act differently than those in the
dominant culture.8 3 This lack of recognition of the idiosyncra-
cies of different cultures maintains the power of the majority
and disempowers those in the minority. s
77 id.
7 id.
71 United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1987), amended by 830
F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Moreno, 742 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir.
1984) (WallaceJ., concurring)).
80 "Powerful actors. . . want objective standards applied to them simply because
these standards always, and already, reflect them and their culture. These actors have
been in power; their subjectivity long ago was deemed 'objective' and imposed on the
world." Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 813,
818 (1992).
8 One commentator defines dominant culture as: "[nlon-Hispanic, European
Americans [who] have long believed that their own ethnic culture defined the civic
culture of the United States," and further states: "White Anglo-Saxon Protestant val-
ues define the identity of the United States." Carlos Villarreal, Culture in Lawmaking:
A Chicano Perspective, 24 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 1193, 1195-97 (1991).
82 Delgado, supra note 80, at 818.
89 Id. at 816.
I4 d. at 818.
[Vol. 90
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Others maintain that the use of the objective standard in
criminal law may lead to injustice"' or unfairness86 because that
standard does not encompass the suspect's "social reality., 87 Al-
though the use of that standard appears to treat all individuals
equally, in fact, it does not.88 By ignoring cultural factors that
have shaped the suspect's perspective, the objective test imposes
a false norm upon the suspect.89
Additionally, commentators note that the use of the objec-
tive test, and the failure to consider subjective factors, deni-
grates "the human dignity and uniqueness of each individual."90
Focusing on objective factors minimizes the value of individual
rights and leads courts to "anaesthetize their hearts and detach
themselves from the real human being who stands before
them."9'
B. THE REFINED OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR CUSTODY
The courts have confronted this debate about the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the objective standard. Generally,
they have favored the use of the objective test in determining
"custody."92 A few courts, however, have been willing to con-
sider subjective factors, such as alienage, threats of deportation,
See Delores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete?
A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 462-63
(1981).
' Id. at 465. "The law, by abstracting human beings out of their social reality, con-
fers upon them a formal equality. But this formal equality is illusory and in fact leads
to unjust consequences, for the 'systematic application of an equal scale to systemati-
cally unequal individuals necessarily tends to reinforce systemic inequalities."' Id. (ci-
tations omitted).
87 Id. at 462-63.
See id. at 465.
89 See id.
'0 Ronald J. Bacigal, Choosing Perspectives in Criminal Procedure, 6 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. 677, 724 (1998).
9" Id. at 725.
'
2 SeeUnited States v. Ramos-Toros, Nos. 94-30447, 94-30448, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
28186 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 1995); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir.
1987); United States v.Joe, 770 F. Supp. 607 (D.N.M. 1991).
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and language difficulties in their determination of the custody
question. 3
In United States v. Beraun-Panez,9 4 the Ninth Circuit reiterated
its support of an objective test for the analysis of custody, but
held that when officers know of a subjective factor, such as the
suspect's status as an alien, this element may be considered in
determining whether the suspect was in custody.95 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals referred to this approach as the "'re-
fined' objective standard." 6 In this case, the court found that
because the officers had known of the suspect's alienage, had
taken steps to ascertain this information before the questioning,
had threatened the suspect with deportation, had learned that
he had some difficulty with the English language, and had iso-
lated him from others, the test here should be "how a reason-
able person who was an alien would perceive and react to the
remarks. 9 7 Based on these facts, the court found the defendant
" See United States v. Ontiveros, Nos. 88-1433, 89-10086, 88-10048, 1990 W.L.
56821 (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 1990); United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, amended
by 830 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Moreno, 742 F.2d 532 (9th Cir.
1984).
Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d at 578.
"' Id. at 581.
96 Id.
97 Id. (citing, inter alia, Moreno, 742 F.2d at 537-38 (Wallace, J., concurring)). See
also Ontiveros, 1990 WL 56821, at *4 (applying the same standard to consider "'how a
reasonable person who was an alien would perceive and react to' the situation");
United States ex rel. Argo v. Platt, 673 F. Supp. 282, 289 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (reserving the
question of whether to apply the Miranda refined objective test, but indicating that it
seemed "more logical" than a purely objective test); cf Moreno, 742 F.2d at 536 (ex-
plaining, in Fourth Amendment context, that the defendant's "lack of familiarity with
police procedures in this country, his alienage and his limited ability to speak and
understand the English language contributed significantly to the quantum of coer-
cion present"); id. at 537-38 (Wallace, J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority's
consideration of alienage and knowledge of police procedures, but acknowledging
that "[i]ncluding obvious language barriers as a quality of a hypothetical reasonable
man would not burden the police or make unnecessarily subjective the application of
a reasonable man test"). See also United States v. $25,000 U.S. Currency, 853 F.2d
1501, 1510 (9th Cir. 1988) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (questioning the majority's failure
to consider the defendant's alienage and language difficulties in reaching its decision
that he was not "seized" under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Recalde,
761 F.2d 1448, 1454 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding, in Fourth Amendment context, that
the defendant, a resident alien, reasonably could have felt unable to terminate his
encounter with police officers due to his Argentine background and cultural acquies-
cence to authority). But see Ramos-Toros, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 28186, at *15 (relying
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was in custody when he was confronted by law enforcement offi-
98cers.
Other courts have declined to adopt the refined objective
test for determining custody. In United States v. Chalan,9 the de-
fendant, a Native American, argued that he was in custody when
the Pueblo Governor requested him to come to his office to talk
with police officers. 1°° The defendant contended that his atten-
dance at the meeting was compelled because tribal custom dic-
tated that he could not refuse the Governor's request and that
he was not free to leave the meeting until the Governor dis-
missed him.1°1
The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument. It found that the
defendant was not in custody when he was questioned by po-
lice.0 2 The court explained that no one used force or even
threats of force to get the defendant to attend the meeting, that
he came to the Governor's office voluntarily, and that he was
free to leave if he decided to do so.03 The court recognized that
the "Governor's actions and status may have influenced Chalan
to attend the interview,"104 but it ruled that this influence did
not create a custodial situation so that the defendant was not
objectively free to leave if he so chose. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court did not address how a reasonable person who
was a Native American would perceive and react to this situa-
tion105
A trial court concluded that, by approaching the custody
question in this way, the Tenth Circuit had "implicitly rejected"
on the traditional objective test in deciding that the defendant was not in custody
when he was questioned).
' Beraun-Pantz, 812 F.2d at 582.
9'812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987).
"0 Id. at 1306.




,' See generally United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751, 757 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
that subjective factors such as a defendant's "background" and "upbringing" are gen-
erally irrelevant to the legal question of whether a Fourth Amendment seizure had
occurred, "other than to the extent that they may have been known to the officer and




the refined objective approach on the basis of cultural heritage.
In United States v. Joe, 06 the district court reasoned:
In spite of the fact that the Court in Chalan specifically found that a "rea-
sonable Pueblo Indian" would not have felt free to leave the Governor's
office, the Court determined that the defendant was not in custody when
he made the statements he sought to suppress. Thus the Court implic-
itly rejected modification of the reasonable man standard to account for
the defendant's cultural heritage.
Following this lead, the court in Joe declined to adopt a re-
fined objective standard that would consider the defendant's
cultural history.'0 8 It found that adopting this standard would
significantly burden the police officer because the officer would
be required to ascertain each suspect's cultural background and
then would have to determine if, or how, that background af-
fected the suspect's perception of the encounter9
This, however, is not the case. The Ninth Circuit specifi-
cally found in Beraun-Panez that the refined objective test ap-
plied only because the police officers had already ascertained
Beraun-Panez's immigration status before questioning him and
may have used that information to their own benefit.'10 Fur-
thermore, the court noted that the determinative issue was not
how this particular suspect perceived the situation, but how a
"reasonable person who was an alien would perceive and react
to the remarks.""'
Despite its announced rejection of the refined objective
standard, the Joe court was willing to consider the suspect's
knowledge of English to determine whether custody had oc-
curred. The court noted that "when a suspect's knowledge of
English is clearly inadequate, it may be appropriate to refine the
standard to account for this characteristic."'' The court so de-
cided because it believed that the suspect's language abilities
would be obvious to the police officer. Consequently, the offi-
," 770 F. Supp. 607 (D.N.M. 1991).
1
07 Id at 610.
"a Id. at 611.
109 Id.
,,0 United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 581, amended by 830 F.2d 127 (9th
Cir. 1987).
111 L
.. Joe, 770 F. Supp. at 611.
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cer would not have to speculate about the suspect's background
and the officer could easily adapt his conduct to that factor."'
The Ninth Circuit's use of subjective factors, such as cul-
ture, alienage, and language difficulties, is appropriate and fair.
By using such factors, the court is recognizing that not all per-
sons act or think alike. The court is acknowledging that, occa-
sionally, certain subjective factors, such as culture or alienage,
may affect an individual's perception of a certain situation. The
inclusion of these factors in the custody analysis does not un-
fairly burden the Government because, before the court uses
these factors to analyze the situation, the court insists that the
police know of these subjective factors through their own inves-
tigation."4 Furthermore, the Government can easily prevent the
later suppression of a suspect's statement, by merely taking the
precaution of providing Miranda warnings to a suspect who, ar-
guably, may have been in custody at the time of the interroga-
tion.
IV. INTERROGATION
A. THE MEANING OF INTERROGATION
Interrogation under Miranda encompasses "express ques-
tioning or its functional equivalent."1 1 5 The Court has defined
"functional equivalent" as "any words or actions on the part of
the police" 6 (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."11 7 To deter-
,, Id. at 612 n.3.
", Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d at 581.
"' Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
... Miranda warnings are required when police are conducting a custodial interroga-
tion of a suspect. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The warnings are
required to safeguard the suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege during "incommuni-
cado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere." Id. at 445 (em-
phasis added). If the interrogator is an undercover government agent and the
suspect is unaware of this fact, no Miranda warnings need be given because the pres-
sure of a "police-dominated atmosphere" is absent. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292,
296 (1990).
,17 Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Because consent to search is not, in and of itself, a self-
incriminating statement, a request by police for consent to search from the suspect
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mine whether interrogation has occurred, courts may consider
the intent of the police but the focus should be "primarily upon
the perceptions of the suspect."" 8
The police are not expected to know the hidden idiosyncra-
sies of the suspect."9 But unlike the objective standard used by
most courts in the custody analysis, if the police have some
knowledge about a suspect's "unusual susceptibility... to a par-
ticular form of persuasion," 0 then this may be a critical factor
in deciding "whether the police should have known that their
words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
,,121
response...
Consequently, in the case of suspects from different cul-
tures, the courts should ask: did the officer know of this sus-
pect's unfamiliarity with the American system ofjustice, cultural
fear of authority, or limited comprehension of English and if so,
in light of these factors, should the officer have known that his
words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from this suspect?
2
does not constitute interrogation. United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th
Cir. 1996); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Wainright,
581 F.2d 1149, 1152 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 472 (9th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Goodridge, 945 F. Supp 359, 368 (D. Mass. 1996) (quot-
ing United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir. 1993)). Some courts have
held, however, that a request for a consent to search may require Miranda warnings
before the government may use the consent to search in order to link the defendant
to the searched item or location. See United States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040, 1043-44
(9th Cir. 1993).
8 Innis, 446 U.S. at 301; see also United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222,
1226 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[C]ourts should 'focus primarily upon the perceptions of the
suspect, rather than the intent of the police.'" (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301));
United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The officer's intent in
asking the question is relevant, but not decisive.") (citing United States v. Booth, 669
F.2d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 1981)).
"9 Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02 ("[S] ince the police surely cannot be held accountable
for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation
can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should
have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.") (emphasis
omitted).
1
20 Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8.
121 Id. See alsoJonathan L. Marks, Note, Confusing the Fifth Amendment with the Sixth:
Lower Court Misapplication of the Innis Definition of Interrogation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1073,
1102 n.185 (1989).
122 See generally Marks, supra note 121, at 1102-03.
1999] COTFESSIONS AND CULTURE
B. THE BORDER EXCEPTION
There are several exceptions to the requirement that
Miranda warnings must be given before one is subjected to cus-
todial interrogation. Routine questioning at the international
border is one such exception.123 Some courts have decided that
Miranda does not apply to border questioning because the envi-
ronment is not custodial. 24  Other courts have held that, al-
though custodial, a border interrogation may be exempt from
Miranda requirements for security reasons."
The Government may question individuals seeking entry
into the United States about their citizenship and travel plans
without first warning the travelers of their Miranda rights.26
Even secondary interviews might not be covered by Miranda be-
cause they are viewed as "routine. 2 7 Although it is difficult to
understand how moving a suspect to a separate area and detain-
ing him for questioning could be reviewed as "routine," the
courts have ruled that due to security concerns, greater restric-
tions on one's freedom of movement at the border will be
'2 United States v. Berish, 925 F.2d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gar-
cia, 905 F.2d 557 (1st Cir. 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895,
899 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1"979).
,24 See, e.g., United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1119 (11th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Manasen, 909 F.2d 1357, 1358-59 & nn.1-2 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Salinas, 439 F.2d 376, 379-80 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Pigott, No. 93-CR-
199S(H), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6922, at *9 (W.D.N.Y.Jan. 28, 1994).
"' See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) ("National self protection
reasonably requir[es] one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come
in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in."). See also United
States v. Azoroh, Nos. 91-2074, 91-2075, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7423, at *3 (6th Cir.
April 9, 1992); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1983).
121 Moya, 74 F.3d at 1120; Azoroh, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7423, at *3; Manasen, 909
F.2d at 1358; Silva, 715 F.2d at 46; Pigot4 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6922, at *8-9; cf.
United States v. Vigil-Montanel, 753 F.2d 996, 998 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that
questioning at an airport security checkpoint is analogous to routine questioning at
the border and therefore does not require Miranda warnings); United States v.
Zapata, 647 F. Supp. 15, 19 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding that U.S. Customs Officers may
lawfully question individuals departing the country without first warning them of their
Miranda rights).
12 Moya, 74 F.3d at 1120 ("[A] secondary interview is part of the border routine
and does not require Miranda warnings."); Silva, 715 F.2d at 47 ("Such routine ques-
tions are necessary to enforce immigration and customs regulations, and border offi-
cials are charged with the responsibility of detaining those seeking admission in order
to determine their admissibility."); see also Heny, 604 F.2d at 920.
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viewed as "routine," and not custodial.'28 If the encounter goes
beyond routine, however, Miranda warnings are required.'2
C. THE ROUTINE BOOKING QUESTION EXCEPTION
Another exception involves routine booking questions. In
Pennsylvania v. Muniz,"' a plurality of the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that questions of an arrestee regarding biographical
data are exempt from the requirements of Miranda, not because
these questions do not constitute interrogation, but because
they are asked for administrative, rather than investigative, pur-
131
poses.
There are limits, however, to the booking exception. Gov-
ernment agents do not have free rein to ask any question they
choose during the booking process. As a plurality of the Court
declared, "'the police may not ask questions, even during book-
ing, that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions."
3 2
Consequently, this exception is inapplicable when police of-
ficers knew or should have known that the questions they asked
during the booking process "were reasonably likely to elicit an
'2 Moya, 74 F.3d at 1120; see also Pigott, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6922, at *9.
' For example, "when a person is discovered to be concealing suspicious materi-
als, or 'when a person is taken to a private room and strip searched,'" Miranda may
apply. United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting Salinas,
439 F.2d at 380) (emphasis omitted); see also Moya, 74 F.3d at 1120 ("[Qjuestioning at
the border must rise to a distinctly accusatory level before it can be said that a reason-
able person would feel restraints on his ability to roam to the 'degree associated with
formal arrest."' (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984)); United
States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1981).
496 U.S. 582 (1990) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 601-02. Biographical data includes the individual's name, address, height,
weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age. Id. at 601. This exception "exempts
from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the 'biographical data necessary to
complete booking or pretrial services.'" Id. at 601 (quoting Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae at 12, Muniz (No. 89-213)); see also, e.g., United States v. D'Anjou, 16
F.3d 604, 608 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Munix, 496 U.S. at 601). On the other hand,
some lower courts do not view booking questions as interrogation. Rather these
courts view the "routine gathering of biographical data" as an administrative matter
which, therefore, lacks the likelihood of eliciting an incriminating response. See, e.g.,
United States v. Salgado, No. 92-30199, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12322, at *8-*9 (9th
Cir. 1993).
"' Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602 n.14 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at
13, Muniz (No. 89-213)).
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incriminating response."33 The inquiry is an objective one:
based on the totality of the circumstances, should the officers
have known that their questions were likely to elicit incriminat-
ing information?3 4  The officers' intent is relevant but not de-
terminative.'-"
To ascertain whether the police have exceeded the bounda-
ries of the booking exception, the courts should first consider
"the nature of the information being sought."31 6  If it goes be-
yond "'simple identification information,"31 7 then it probably
goes beyond the parameters of the exception. Next, the courts
should consider the nature of the question: "whether the in-
quiry was 'innocent of any investigative purpose?""3 8 "The rela-
tionship of the question asked to the crime suspected is highly
.. Hughes v. State, 695 A.2d 132, 140 (Md. 1997), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 459 (1997).
This case notes a distinction between the test for interrogation set forth in Muniz and
the one set forth in Innis. Id. at 137-38. In Muniz, the Court defined interrogation as
questions "designed to elicit incriminating admissions." Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602 n.14.
In Innis, the Court defined interrogation as any questions that the police know or
should know are "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Rhode Island
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
The Maryland court noted that:
The difference between the two standards is that the former limits the scope of the
booking question exception based solely on the actual intent of the police officer in posing
the question, while the latter restricts the exception based on an objective assessment of
the likelihood, in light of both the context of the questioning and the content of the ques-
tion, that the question will elicit an incriminating response.
Hughes, 695 A.2d at 138.
The court candidly admits that the distinction has gone largely unnoticed. Id. For
the most part, lower courts rely on the Innis test to define interrogation and to de-
termine whether the booking exception should apply. See, e.g., CornellJr. v. Thomp-
son, 63 F.3d 1279, 1286 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 608
(4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Middleton, No.
90-30177, 1990 WL 198407, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1990); United States v.
Goodridge, 945 F. Supp. 359, 365 (D. Mass. 1996); Thompson v. United States, 821 F.
Supp. 110, 119-20 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
,' United States v. Doe, 878 F.2d 1546, 1551 (1st Cir. 1989).
1n Id.
" United States v. Minkowitz, 889 F. Supp. 624, 627 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
Id. (quoting United States ex reL Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1113 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1975)).
'" Id., quotingUnited States v. Carmona, 873 F.2d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting
United States v. Gotchis, 803 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1986)).
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relevant."" 9 If the information sought is closely tied to the
crime being investigated, there is a strong inference that the of-
ficer should have known that his inquiry was "'reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.',
140
In the context of alienage, the courts have been particularly
strict about the application of the exception. 141 In United States
v. Gonzalez-Sandoval,4 2 the Ninth Circuit explained that the
booking "exception is inapplicable ... where the elicitation of
information regarding immigration status is reasonably likely to
inculpate the respondent.',
43
In this case, Gonzalez was arrested when his parole officer
suspected he was illegally in the United States.4 After the de-
fendant's arrest, a Border Patrol agent visited him in a holding
cell. 4 5 Without providing Miranda warnings, the agent "asked
Gonzalez where he was born and whether he had documents
verifying his legal entry into the United States.' 4 6 Gonzalez re-
sponded to these questions.4 7  Additionally the agent asked
Gonzalez if he had ever used any other names.4 8 Gonzalez told
"' United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing
United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1237-38 (9th Cir. 1981)).
"0 Minhowitz, 889 F. Supp. at 627, quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601
(1990) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)); see also United
States v. Garcia, No. 96 Cr. 115 (RPP), 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14035, at *28 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 25, 1996) (finding that questions relating to the residence of the defendant
were not incriminating because they were not aimed at investigating the suspected
crimes but rather at obtaining such information in order to complete a "pedigree
sheet").
"' For cases involving government questioning on matters other than alienage and
citizenship in which the court found the booking exception inapplicable, see United
States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 1993) (car ownership); United States
v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1986) (address); Minkowitz, 889 F. Supp. at 627
(possession of credits cards); Hughes v. State, 695 A.2d 132, 140 (Md. 1997) (drug
usage); but for a contrary view on questioning about drug usage see State v. Geasley,
619 N.E. 2d 1086 (Ohio 1993).
1 894 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1990).
,41 Id. at 1046; see also United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th
Cir. 1988); Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1280.






the agent that he had previously used an alias.1 49 The agent ran
a records check under the alias and found the record of the de-
fendant's deportation.50 At that time, the agent first advised
Gonzalez of his Miranda rights. 51 Gonzalez was then charged
with being a deported alien found in the United States.
52
The Ninth Circuit suppressed the responses Gonzalez pro-
vided before he was warned of his Miranda rights.1 53 The court
found that because the agent suspected that Gonzalez was in the
United States illegally and because the questions the agent
asked were reasonably likely to elicit responses which would
prove the crime with which Gonzalez was ultimately charged,
Gonzalez was interrogated.5 4 Consequently, the agent should
have warned Gonzalez of his Miranda rights before undertaking
this interrogation.
In United States v. Doe, 55 the First Circuit applied a similar
rule and held the booking exception inapplicable when the
Coast Guard questioned defendants about their citizenship
without warning them of their Miranda rights. 56 In Doe, the
Coast Guard rescued the defendants from their sinking sailboat
and arrested them when the Guard saw bales of marijuana ris-
ing to the surface of the water. 57 The court refused to apply the
booking exception to the Coast Guard's questions regarding the
defendant's citizenship for two reasons. First, no administrative
need to ask these questions existed at the time they were asked,
as the authorities detained the defendants on a Coast Guard
vessel, rather than at a police station. 8 Second, the court ex-
plained that
questions about citizenship, asked on the high seas, of a person present









,' 878 F.2d 1546 (lst Cir. 1989).
,'Id. at 1551.
,17 Id. at 1548.
8 Id. at 1551.
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bly likely to elicit an incriminating response,' because the answers to
these questions could determine whether the United States had jurisdic-
tion to prosecute these individuals for drug smuggling.
159
Although these cases were decided prior to the Supreme
Court's explanation of the booking exception in Pennsylvania v.
Muniz,"6 ° courts have continued to rely on their reasoning after
Muniz. In Thompson v. United States,161 for example, a federal
immigration officer questioned the defendant about his citizen-
ship during the course of investigating drug trafficking and im-
migration offenses. 62 The district court found the booking
exception inapplicable because the agent's question was directly
related to the crimes with which the defendant was ultimately
charged, making it reasonably likely that the response would be.... 163
incriminating. Consequently, this question constituted inter-
rogation. 6' The court found the booking exception inapplica-
ble here because the agent's question about this defendant's
immigration status was reasonably likely to inculpate the defen-
dant.' 65
V. WARNINGS
Miranda warnings need not be given in any specific way.'66
"Miranda itself indicated that no talismanic incantation was re-
quired to satisfy its strictures."' 67 As long as the warnings "rea-
sonably 'conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights,""6' Miranda is
satisfied.
To determine whether a government agent reasonably con-
veyed Miranda warnings to a suspect, the court examines the
' Id. (quoting United States v. Mata Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir.
1983)).
"0 496 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1990) (BrennanJ., plurality opinion).
.6 821 F. Supp. 110 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), af/'d, 35 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1994).
1
62 Id. at 120-21; see also United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993).
6 Thompson, 821 F. Supp. at 120-21.
1 Id. at 121.
' Id at 120-21.
" California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (per curiam).
167 Id.
'6, Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361)
(alteration in original).
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language that the agent used to communicate those warnings.
169
If an agent communicates the warnings in a foreign language
due to the suspect's lack of proficiency in English,'7" the court
will analyze the foreign language used by the agents.1
The translation of a suspect's Miranda rights need not be
perfect. If the defendant is told that: (1) he need not talk to the
authorities; (2) if he does, his statements will be used against
him; and (3) he has a right to an attorney, the court will likely
find the advisal acceptable. Even if the translator conveys rights
in a dialect different from the suspect's, or with grammatical er-
rors or a poor accent, the translation will not be constitutionally
defective as long as the translator reasonably conveys the gist of
the rights.' 72
If the translation of the rights under this language does not
adequately convey to the individual his rights under Miranda,
then the court will find the warnings defective and will suppress
the statements made by the suspect.75 In People v. Mejia-
1b9 Eagan, 492 U.S. at 203; Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360-61.
,7' Language barriers also may affect the validity of a suspect's waiver of Miranda
rights. For a fuller discussion of this topic, see infra notes 171-90 and accompanying
text. "When a suspect cannot communicate in English, law enforcement officers
should give the Miranda warnings in a language the suspect understands to ensure
that the suspect comprehends the Miranda warnings and can knowingly and intelli-
gently waive the Miranda rights." State v. Santiago, 556 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Wis. 1996).
171 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1501-02 (10th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Toscano-Padilla, 996 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. June 16, 1993) (unpub-
lished); United States v. Soria-Garcia, 947 F.2d 900, 901-02 (10th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Yousef, 925 F.
Supp. 1063, 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Higareda-Santa Cruz, 826 F. Supp.
355, 359-60 (D. Or. 1993); People v. Marquez, 822 P.2d 418, 426 (Cal. 1992), habeas
corpus granted sub nom. In re Marquez, 822 P.2d 435 (Cal. 1992); People v. Mejia-
Mendoza, 965 P.2d 777 (Colo. 1998) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Perez, 581 N.E.2d
1010, 1014 (Mass. 1991); Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 562 N.E.2d 797, 803 (Mass.
1990); Commonwealth v. Alves, 625 N.E.2d 559, 560-61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); State v.
Dominguez-Ramirez, 563 N.W.2d 245, 250, 252-53 (Minn. 1997); State v. Delbosque,
No. 18872-4-I1, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 612, at *11 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1997);
Santiago, 556 N.W.2d at 690, 696.
7 United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1990).
171 See, e.g., Higareda-Santa Cruz, 826 F. Supp. at 359-60. "The translation of a sus-
pect's Miranda rights need not be a perfect one, so long as the defendant under-
stands that he does not need to speak to police and that any statement he makes may
be used against him." Hernandez, 913 F.2d at 1510; see also Hernandez, 93 F.3d at 1502
(citing Soria-Garcia, 947 F.2d at 901-03); Meia-Mendoza, 965 P.2d at 777; State v.
Teran, 862 P.2d 137, 139 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Hernandez, 913 F.2d at
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Mendoza,74 the Supreme Court of Colorado ruled that the gov-
ernment failed to properly advise the defendant of his Miranda
rights. The Court found that the translator lacked experience
in translating and in assisting authorities in explaining Miranda
rights to suspects. 75 Consequently his translation of the Miranda
rights was inaccurate and embellished.176  A tape recording of
the interrogation disclosed that the translator's statements did
not reasonably convey the Miranda rights to this defendant.
17 7
Additionally, the translator volunteered information to the de-
fendant and to the police.'78 He actively encouraged the defen-
dant to co-operate with the police, thereby violating his role as
an impartial conveyor of information from one source to the
other.
9
The court may also examine the qualifications and status of
the person who translates during the interrogation. If the in-
terpreter is inexperienced in either translating or in helping
authorities explain Miranda rights to a suspect, his translation
may be inadequate."" On the other hand, the United States
government is not constitutionally required to employ a certi-
fied interpreter at a police interrogation.1 8 1 The fact of whether
an interpreter is "certified" may be relevant to, but not determi-
native of, the issue of his competence. 82
As a matter of fundamental fairness, courts expect the in-
terpreter to be impartial. Although the setting of police inter-
1510). See also People v. Ripic, 182 A.D. 2d 226, 236-37 (N.Y. 1992) (finding the
state's failure to provide an appropriate interpreter for a hearing-impaired suspect
rendered the Miranda warnings defective). For an interesting discussion of the con-
stitutional rights of the deaf and hearing-impaired, see Jamie McAlister, Deaf and
Hard-of-Hearing Criminal Defendants: How You Gonna Get Justice if You Can't Talk to the
Judge?, 26 Amz. ST. L.J. 163 (1994).
174 965 P.2d 777 (Colo. 1998).
11 I& at 781.
1




0 Id. at 781.
"' Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 562 N.E.2d 797, 803 (Mass. 1990); State v. Del-
bosque, No. 18872-4-11, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 612, at *11 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 25,
1997).
112 Delbosque, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 612, at *11-*12.
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rogation is not as formal as that of the courtroom, the inter-
preter is still expected to serve as a neutral conveyor of informa-
tion between the suspect and the police.8 3 He is expected to
translate exactly what he hears and is not permitted to add or
delete any information.84
It is not unconstitutional, however, for a police officer to
serve as an interpreter during custodial interrogation.' e  But if
the point of Miranda is to dispel the compulsion in the inher-
ently coercive environment of custodial interrogation,' it is cu-
rious that courts are not impressed by the likelihood of
increasing that compulsion, by allowing police officers to serve
as translators during the interrogation. 7 Additionally it is curi-
ous that police officers, who are "engaged in the often competi-
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime,"'' 8 are classified as
impartial 8 9 when translating for suspects during incommuni-
cado interrogation.
The courts do discourage the use of a confidential infor-
mant or a co-defendant as a translator. Although there is no per
se rule that constitutionally prohibits an informant or co-
defendant from serving as an interpreter during custodial inter-
rogation, courts encourage the government to find better alter-
natives.19°
" Meia-Mendoza, 965 P.2d at 781.
1B Id
People v. Marquez, 822 P. 2d 418, 427 (Cal. 1992), habeas corpus granted sub nom.
In re Marquez, 822 P.2d 435 (Cal. 1992); Colon-Cruz, 562 N.E.2d at 803-04; Common-
wealth v. Alves, 625 N.E.2d 559, 561 (Mass. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Dominguez-
Ramirez, 563 N.W.2d 245, 255 (Minn. 1997); Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 465 A.2d
1256, 1264 (Pa. Super. 1983); Delbosque, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 612, at *12. Some
jurisdictions have statutes prohibiting police officers from serving as interpreters dur-
ing custodial interrogation of a suspect. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-2702 (e)
(1981); MINN. STAT. § 611.30-.33 (1996). See also Barrera v. United States, 599 A.2d
1119, 1130-33 (D.C. App. 1991) (applying D.C. CODEANN. § 31-2702(e)); Dominguez-
Ramirez, 563 N.W.2d at 253 (applying MINN. STAT. § 611.30-.33); State v. Mitjans, 408
N.W.2d 824, 830 (Minn. 1987).
186 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
'"Dominguez-Ramirez, 563 N.W.2d at 255; Carrillo, 465 A.2d at 1264; Delbosque, 1997
Wash. App. LEXIS 612, at *12.
'"Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
"'Delbosque, 1997 Wash App. LEXIS 612, at *12.
'9 United States v. Caba, 955 F.2d 182, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Vil-
legas, 928 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir. 1991). But cf. State v. Cervantes, 814 P.2d 1232,
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VI. ASSERTION OF RIGHTS
A. RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
Once an individual in custody has been provided Miranda
warnings and asserts his right to remain silent,'9' all police inter-
rogation of him must stop. 92 In order to introduce statements
1234-35 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (finding a violation of due process for the police to
use a potential co-defendant as an interpreter to advise the defendant of his Miranda
rights).
'9'The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether an individual must assert the
right to silence unequivocally. In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994), the
Court held a valid assertion of counsel under Miranda requires the suspect to "unam-
biguously request counsel .... [Hie must articulate his desire to have counsel pres-
ent sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would
understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." See infra notes 211-21 and
accompanying text.
A number of courts have adopted a similar rule for the right to remain silent. See,
e.g., United States v. Mikell, 102 F.3d 470, 476-77 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Banks, 78 F.3d 1190, 1198 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, Mills v. United States, 117 S. Ct.
478 (1996), remand, 122 F.3d 346 (1997); United States v.Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 955
(8th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Thompson, 866 F.2d 268, 272 (8th Cir.
1989)); United States v. Maisonneuve, 950 F. Supp. 1280, 1285 (D. Vt. 1996); United
States v. Andrade, 925 F. Supp. 71, 79-80 (D. Mass. 1996), aff'd, 135 F.3d 104 (1st Cir.
1998); State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 717-18 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1002
(1997); State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Minn. 1995); State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d
54, 66 (Vt. 1995). The question of whether the Davis standard should be applied to
the assertion of the right to silence remains open in the Ninth Circuit. United States
v. Soliz, 129 F.3d 499, 504 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997). But see Evans v. Demosthenes, 902 F.
Supp. 1253, 1259 (D. Nev. 1995), aff'd, 98 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521
U.S. 1108 (1997) (holding the Davis standard applicable to the right to remain si-
lent).
For a discussion of this issue, see Wayne D. Holly, Ambiguous Invocations of the Right
to Remain Silent: A Post-Davis Analysis and Proposal, 29 SETON HAUL L. REv. 558, 581
(1998), wherein the author disagrees with the above decisions and proposes a differ-
ent approach to ambiguous assertions of the right to remain silent. He suggests that
an individual would invoke the right to remain silent "by any words or actions, includ-
ing a refusal to answer questions, that could reasonably be interpreted by the police
as intended to invoke the right to silence." Id. at 581. An invocation would be con-
sidered clear if there could be no "'reasonable doubt' of the suspect's intent to in-
voke the right to remain silent." Id. at 582. An invocation would be considered
ambiguous if it left the "police 'reasonably uncertain' whether the suspect intended
to invoke the right to silence." Id. at 583. In the event of an ambiguous invocation,
the police could ask clarifying questions of the suspect. Id. at 583-85.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966). If the police provide the sus-
pect with defective warnings or the suspect asserts his rights and the police, nonethe-
less, continue to interrogate him, those statements will be suppressed in the
Government's case-in-chief. The Government, however, may use the statements to
impeach the defendant if he testifies in his own behalf. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714.
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made by a suspect after he expresses his desire to remain silent,
the government must prove that the suspect's "'right to cut off
questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.' 193 To meet this bur-
den, the government must establish that after a suspect asserted
his right to silence,194 a "significant period of time" passed be-
fore a government agent again gave the suspect Miranda warn-
ings, the suspect validly waived his rights, and the agent
questioned the suspect about an unrelated crime.1 9
The police do not have to scrupulously honor a person's
demand for silence, however, if they do not "interrogate" him
any further. If the court determines that an officer's statements
to, or questions of, the suspect did not constitute interrogation,
the responses are admissible.'9 6
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit has held that after an indi-
vidual had asserted his right to remain silent, an officer could
permissibly tell him that "the agents had seized approximately
600 pounds of cocaine," and that he was "in serious trouble." 97
According to the Ninth Circuit, such statements do not consti-
tute interrogation and are merely statements attendant to arrest
and custody. It is difficult to understand how such statements
were not "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
722-23 (1975); Harris v. NewYork, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). On the other hand, an
involuntary statement may not be used for any purpose, including impeachment of
the defendant. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978); Henry v. Kernan, No.
98-15768, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26776, at *3-*4 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 1999).
... Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473,
478; People v. Montano, 226 Cal. App. 3d 914, 930-31, (1991)).
194 A suspect may choose to "selectively waive his Miranda rights by agreeing to an-
swer some questions but not others." Soliz, 129 F.3d at 503. An officer must "scrupu-
lously honor" the defendant's decision to remain silent on certain subjects and
answer questions about other subjects. Id. at 504. If the officer does not "scrupu-
lously honor" the defendant's decision and proceeds to question the defendant about
matters other than the ones he indicated a willingness to discuss, the responses to
those impermissible questions will be suppressed. Id.
.9 Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106; see also Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1021 (2d Cir.
1989) (citing Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04); State v. Azuara, No. C2-96-113, 1996 WL
706875, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1996) (unpublished).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Moreno-Flores, 33 F.3d 1164, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Salgado, No. 92-30199, 1993 WL 164682, at *3 (9th Cir. May 13,
1993); State v. Salgado, 473 So. 2d 84, 89-90 (La. Ct. App. 1985).97 Moreno-F/ores, 33 F.3d at 1169.
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from the suspect."'9' If the focus is "primarily upon the percep-
tions of the suspect,"' ' it seems highly foreseeable that a suspect
would be motivated to defend himself against such serious alle-
gations.
The court also held that the officer's question regarding
how the suspect's night was did not constitute interrogation, be-
cause this question was "innocuous" and unlikely to elicit an in-
criminating response from the suspect."'
Additionally, if an individual asserts his right to remain si-
lent, a government agent may ask booking questions because
generally these questions are asked for administrative purposes
and are not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect.20' On the other hand, a government agent
may not permissibly ask booking questions for an investigatory,
rather than an administrative purpose after a suspect has as-
serted the right to remain silent.0 2
B. FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
If an individual who is undergoing custodial interrogation
requests an attorney,0 3 "'the interrogation must cease until an
attorney is present.',20 4 Once a suspect requests the assistance of
counsel during an interrogation, 0 the police may not re-initiate
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
' See United States v. Equiha-Juarez, 852 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02 n.7).
'0' Moreno-Flores, 33 F.3d at 1170.
0' Salgado, 1993 WL 164682, at *3-*4; Gladden v. Roach, 864 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th
Cir. 1989); State v. Geasley, 619 N.E.2d 1086, 1089-90 (Ohio 1993).
202 United States v. Poole, 794 F.2d 462, 467, amended, 806 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1986).
203 This right to counsel emanates from Miranda v. Arizona and the Fifth Amend-
ment's protection against compelled self-incrimination. 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966); see
also Michigan v.Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986).
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
474).
' Because consent is not, in and of itself, self-incriminating, a request for consent
is not interrogation. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. Consequently, if the
suspect asserts his right to counsel after being mirandized, the authorities may still
request his consent to search. United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.
1996).
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questioning even if the suspect has consulted an attorney.2
Counsel must be present at the interrogation.2 7 Furthermore,
the authorities may not re-interrogate the individual who has
requested counsel about the same crime or even about a "sepa-
rate investigation,, 20 8 unless the individual initiates2'° the conver-
sation with the police and validly waives his rights.
210
The suspect must unambiguously request counsel during
the interrogation.21 1  The test for whether the request was un-
ambiguous is objective.212 The suspect "must articulate his de-
sire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable
police officer in the circumstances would understand the state-
ment to be a request for an attorney., 21 3 If the request is am-
201 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990); United States v. Chan, No. 97
Cr. 319 (MBM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17520, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1997) (finding
that, after asserting his right to counsel, the defendant Lee did not initiate any fur-
ther discussion with the government agent when he conversed with his attorney over
the telephone and then asked the agent to do the same).
207 Minnick, 498 U.S. at 152. "'Thus the need for counsel to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior
to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defen-
dant so desires."' id. at 154 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470); Commonwealth v.
Santiago, 591 A.2d 1095, 1102-03 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) ("Proof that counsel had been
requested, that the police had reinitiated questioning thereafter, and that counsel
was not actually present during any such interrogation, dispositively establishes that the
fifth amendment right to counsel as currently expounded by the Supreme Court was
violated.").
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988).
2'9 To "initiate" a discussion with police after he has asserted a right to counsel, the
suspect must manifest "a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about
the investigation." Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983) (plurality
opinion); see, e.g., United States v. Camacho, 930 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpub-
lished table opinion).
2'0 To be valid, the waiver must be "'knowing and intelligent and found to be so
under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused,
not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities."' Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at
1046 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n.9 (1981)).
", Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
212 Id. (citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987)); see also Diaz v. Sen-
kowski, 76 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1996) ("In the absence of... a clear statement, the
Davis opinion, however, tells us that a suspect's intent is not the controlling factor.").
2's Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; see also United States v. Muhammad, 120 F.3d 688, 698
(7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the words "an attorney" were not an unambiguous re-
quest for counsel); Diaz, 76 F.3d at 63 n.1, 65 (holding that "Do you think I need a
lawyer?" was not an unambiguous request for counsel); Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d
1216, 1220-21 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that "I can't afford a lawyer but is there any-
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biguous, the authorities are entitled to continue the interroga-
tion.2 '4 They are not required to ask the suspect any clarifying
questions in an effort to eliminate the ambiguity.""
Of course, this rule disadvantages those who are unfamiliar
with the American legal system or those whose first language is
not English because they may not know how to communicate an
unequivocal request.216 Furthermore, when a suspect does not
speak English and the assertion is made in a foreign language,
its meaning may be unclear and may depend on such factors as
inflection, dialect, or context.1 7 Additionally, people of certain
way I can get one?" was not an unambiguous request for counsel); Valdez v. State, 900
P.2d 363, 373-74 (Okla. Grim. App. 1995) (holding primarily Spanish-speaking de-
fendant's statement that he had signed a waiver form "because I understand it some-
thing about a lawyer and he want to ask me questions and that's what I'm looking for
a lawyer" to be ambiguous); cf. United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 774 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 917 (1998) (holding that Native American defendant's
statement "that his mother was going to retain [an attorney]" "failed to invoke his
right to counsel at all").
2,' Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.
2 5 Id. at 461.
21 AsJustice Souter noted in his concurring opinion in Davis:.
[C]riminal suspects who may (in Miranda's words) be "thrust into an unfamiliar atmos-
phere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures," would seem an odd
group to single out for the Court's demand of heightened linguistic care. A substantial
percentage of them lack anything like a confident command of the English language;
many are "woefully ignorant," and many more will be sufficiently intimidated by the inter-
rogation process or overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their predicament that the ability to
speak assertively will abandon them.
Davis, 512 U.S. at 469-70 (SouterJ., concurring) (citations omitted); see also id. at 460
(recognizing that the Davis rule will disadvantage defendants with a "lack of linguistic
skills"); United States v. Prestigiacomo, 504 F. Supp. 681, 683 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (declar-
ing, prior to Davis, that where the "[d]efendant was in a strange country, spoke no
English and was undoubtedly unfamiliar with the rights of the accused under Ameri-
can law[,] [i]t would hardly be fair to require such a suspect to formulate his desire
for legal assistance in more formal or precise terms" than he did) (citation omitted);
Janet Ainsworth, In A Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interroga-
tion, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 318-19 (1993); Samira Sadeghi, Hung Up On Semantics: A Cri-
tique of Davis v. United States, 23 HAsTINGs CONST. L.Q. 313, 330 (1995).
217 See, e.g., United States v. Uribe-Galindo, 990 F.2d 522, 526 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993)
(rejecting the defendant's argument that the Spanish interpreter who translated his
question regarding the possibility of getting an attorney at some future point did not
translate his question properly); United States v. De LaJara, 973 F.2d 746, 750 (9th
Cir. 1992), overruled by Davis, 512 U.S. at 461; Ainsworth, supra note 216, at 287;
Sadeghi, supra note 216 at 330-32; William G. Worobec, Designing a "System for Idiots".
An Analysis of the Impracticality of Davis v. United States on Ambiguous Waivers of the Right
to the Presence of Counse 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 239, 266-67 (1995).
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cultures may deem a firm and unambiguous request to be disre-
spectful or dangerous and, therefore, will be unlikely to voice
such a request.28 Lastly, people of certain ethnic backgrounds
are more likely to speak equivocally because they feel powerless
in American society.1 9 Their demeanor and speech reflect this
lack of power.220 The added feature of coercive custodial inter-
rogation merely exacerbates these feelings of powerlessness and
increases the likelihood that they will speak equivocally in this
211setting.
As with the right to remain silent, if the suspect invokes his
right to counsel, the authorities may still ask routine booking
questions, as long as the questions are deemed to be non-
incriminating.22 If the suspect initially asserts his right to coun-
sel, but, during biographical questioning, initiates discussions
with the police and validly waives his right to counsel, the court
will not suppress any statements the suspect subsequently
makes.223 As in other contexts, if the booking questions are in-
tended for investigative rather than administrative purposes, the
questions will be deemed interrogation. 4
2,8 See, e.g., United States v. Bing-Gong, 594 F. Supp. 248, 256 (N.D.N.Y. 1984)
(where witnesses for the defendant testified that the defendant "characteristically will
nod his head as if in agreement with the person to whom he is speaking while also
saying 'yes, yes' even if he cannot understand what is being said to him"); Liu v. State,
628 A. 2d 1376, 1381 (Del. 1993) (where the defendant argued that it is "extremely
unlikely that a native Chinese would understand that he could refuse to submit to of-
ficial police requests .... [T]he Chinese socialization process would lead one to fol-
low whatever-instructions-a law officer would require"); Le v. State, 947 P.2d 535,
543-44 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (where the defendant argued that "in Vietnam, citi-
zens risked torture if they did not cooperate with police").
"2 Ainsworth, supra note 216, at 287.
22U id.
2"' Id. at 287-88.
2 See generally United States v. Camacho, 930 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished
table opinion); United States v. Dougall, 919 F.2d 932, 935 (5th Cir. 1990); Gladden
v. Roach, 864 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hughes, 921 F. Supp.
656, 658 (D. Ariz. 1996).
' See, e.g., Camacho, 930 F.2d at 29; Dougal 919 F.2d at 934-36; Gladden, 864 F.2d
at 1197-98; Hughes, 921 F. Supp. at 658-59.
2' See United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Doe, 878
F.2d 1546, 1551 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280
(9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Minkowitz, 889 F. Supp. 624, 627-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1995);
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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VII. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
An "accused" may also enjoy a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Unlike the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, which
attaches at custodial interrogation, the Sixth Amendment right
attaches only "'at or after the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, pre-
liminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment."'""
Moreover, this right to counsel is offense-specific.226 Once an
accused validly asserts his Sixth Amendment right to counsel for
a specific offense, the authorities may not "deliberately elicit in-
formation, 227 from him about that offense. 28 After his assertion
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, any waiver of this
right by the accused during a police interrogation about the of-
fense for which he invoked the right will be deemed invalid.2
On the other hand, if the accused invokes his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel on a specific offense, the police
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). See United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769,
776-78 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a tribal court arraignment did not trigger the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
22 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991).
27The term "interrogation" is not nearly as relevant in the Sixth Amendment con-
text as it is in the Fifth Amendment/Miranda context. Rather, for the Sixth Amend-
ment to apply, the government official must deliberately elicit statements from an
accused. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964). Although courts use the
term "interrogation" in Sixth Amendment cases, it is not the type of "interrogation"
defined by the Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In Sixth
Amendment cases, courts must focus on the Government's purpose and must deter-
mine whether the words or the actions of the Government were intended to elicit an
incriminating response from the accused. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399
(1977). This contrasts with the "interrogation" defined in Innis as, "express question-
ing or its functional equivalent.. . any words or actions on the part of the police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response .... Innis, 446 U.S. at
300-01.
For a discussion of this issue, see Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and
Miranda: What is "Interrogation?" When Does it Matter?, 67 GEo. LJ. 1, 33 (1978);Jona-
than L. Marks, Note, Confusing the Fifth Amendment with the Sixth: Lower Court Misappli-
cation of the Innis Definition of Interrogation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1073, 1075-76 nn.24-27
(1989); Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without Questions- Rhode Island v. Innis and
United States v. Henry, 78 MicH. L. REV. 1209 (1980).
Michigan v.Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 635 (1986).
2Id.
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may still interrogate him about unrelated, uncharged crimes.3 0
Generally, because the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific and
attaches only when a prosecution has begun, the person ques-
tioned has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel with respect to
the unrelated offenses if no prosecution has begun on those
charges. 3 ' A number of courts, however, have held that al-
though the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach
to unrelated, uncharged offenses, it does attach to "'closely re-
lated' but uncharged crimes. 232
The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment as-
sertion of counsel on the charged crimes does not function as a
Miranda-Edwards assertion of counsel on the uncharged offenses
because the purpose behind the two rights differs. 233 The pur-
pose behind the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the pro-
tection of the layperson against a legal opponent, the
government, once charges have been filed against him. 4 The
purpose behind the Miranda-Edwards rule is the protection of a
suspect in the inherently coercive environment of custodial in-
235terrogation.
Applying this rule, the Second Circuit has held that interro-
gation by government agents about a defendant's immigration
status after he had signed a form allowing his counsel to obtain
INS records does not violate the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel.2 6 The court explained that the actions of the defen-
0 McNei4 501 U.S. at 175-76.
2" Id. at 175.
2"2 United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1997), aff'd, 172 F.3d 41 (3d
Cir. 1998); United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1993); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1104
(9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-58 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Cooper, 949
F.2d 737, 74344 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1342-43
(10th Cir. 1991); People v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d 448, 452 (Ill. 1988); Whittlesey v.
State, 665 A.2d 223, 235 (Md. 1995); State v. Tucker, 645 A.2d 111, 120-21 (N.J.
1994); In rePack, 616 A.2d 1006, 1010-11 (Pa. Super. 1992).
2" McNei!, 501 U.S. at 177-78; Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 739 (citing McNei/, 501 U.S. at
175-78).
' McNei, 501 U.S. at 177-78.
"' Id. at 178.
2" United States v. Thompson, 35 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting McNei4
501 U.S. at 178).
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dant and the attorney did not manifest a request for the assis-
tance of counsel for the client during any subsequent custodial
interrogation."'
Moreover, the Supreme Court has suggested, in dicta, that
an individual may not assert the Miranda-Edwards Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel anticipatorily. 2 8 This right is intended to
protect a person against the inherent pressures of custodial in-
terrogation and "[m]ost rights must be asserted when the gov-




Consequently, many courts will not recognize a defendant's ear-
lier anticipatory assertion of his Fifth Amendment right to
240counsel at a later police interrogation.
There are two flaws in this reasoning. First, a defendant
may not understand the difference between a Sixth Amend-
ment and a Fifth Amendment right to counsel. 241 He may be-
lieve that once he has secured the assistance of an attorney, he
has asserted his interest in being represented by that counsel for
all purposes.242 He may not know, or understand, that he must
reassert that interest when the police interrogate him.243 But the
2 Id. at 103-04.
m McNei 501 U.S. at 182 n.3 ("We have, in fact, never held that a person can in-
voke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than 'custodial interroga-
tion' .... .
29 id.
240 United States v. Grimes, 142 F. 3d 1342, 1348 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S.
Ct. 840 (1999); United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 774-75 (6th Cir. 1997); United
States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 339 (7th Cir. 1994); Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237,
1245-46 (3rd Cir. 1994); United States v. Wright, 962 F.2d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Caldwell, No. 94-310-01, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10868, at *9 (E.D.
Penn. Aug. 2, 1995); United States v. Barnett, 814 F. Supp. 1449, 1453-54 (D. Alaska
1992); People v. Calderon, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104, 105-06 (Ct. App. 1997); Sapp v. State,
690 So. 2d 581, 585 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied 118 S.Ct. 116 (1997); Sauerheber v. State,
698 N.E. 2d 796, 802-03 (Ind. 1998).
241 "Although judges and lawyers may understand and appreciate the subtle distinc-
tions between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, the average person
does not." Michigan v.Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633-34 n.7 (1986).
242 "When an accused requests an attorney, either before a police officer or a mag-
istrate, he does not know which constitutional right he is invoking; he therefore
should not be expected to articulate exactly why or for what purposes he is seeking
counsel." Id.
243 "The simple fact that defendant has requested an attorney indicates that he
does not believe that he is sufficiently capable of dealing with his adversaries single-
handedly." Id at 634.
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Supreme Court, in McNeil, rejected this viewpoint. Without any
analysis, the Court concluded that the individual's invocation of
the right to counsel could not possibly imply "a desire never to
undergo custodial interrogation, about anything, without coun-
sel present.,
244
Secondly, there is the "danger of 'subtle compulsion' 245
when an individual indicates to the Government that he has an
attorney representing him and then later the individual, in the
absence of that attorney, is still approached and interrogated by
the authorities. It is possible that this individual believes that no
matter how many times he asserts his interest in the assistance of
counsel, that interest will not be heeded. He may think that it is
pointless to request counsel in the context of the custodial in-
terrogation because his interest in being represented by an at-
torney has already been, and likely will continue to be,
ignored.246
VIII. WAMVR OF RIGHTS
The validity of a suspect's waiver is, by far, the most contro-
versial issue in the matter of Miranda rights and cultural or eth-
nic background.247  The three major cultural factors in
determining the validity of a Miranda waiver are the suspect's
language difficulties, the suspect's lack of familiarity with the
American legal system, and the mandates of the suspect's cul-
ture with respect to obedience to the police. Additionally, ap-
pellate courts have examined the role of an interpreter in the
waiver process to determine whether the use of an interpreter at
trial vitiates the suspect's earlier waiver, if that waiver was given
without an interpreter.
214 McNei4 501 U.S. at 180 n.1.
2I at 189 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 454 N.W.2d
742, 753 (Wis. 1990) (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting)).
246 Id. at 189 n.2.
217 For a general discussion about this issue, see Linda Friedman Ramirez et al.,
When Language is a Barrier to justice: The Non-English-Speaking Suspect's Waiver of Rights,
GRIM. JUST., Summer 1994, at 2.
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A. KNOWING, VOLUNTARY, AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER STANDARD
To be valid, a waiver of Miranda rights must be made volun-
tarily, knowingly, and intelligently.24 The burden is on the gov-
ernment to prove a valid waiver by a preponderance of the
evidence. 249 The court may not presume a valid waiver from the
suspect's silence,20 but an explicit waiver is not required.21
Sometimes a waiver may be "inferred from the actions and
words of the person interrogated.", 2 The validity of a waiver is
decided on "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
[each] case, including the background, experience and con-
duct" of the person questioned.25 The suspect need not be ad-
vised of "all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of
interrogation" for his waiver to be valid. 4
To be voluntary, a waiver must be "the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or decep-
tion."255 To make this determination, the court will analyze
whether the waiver was a result of coercion by either physical
force or "other deliberate means calculated to break the sus-
pect's will .... ,,26 It will ask whether as a result of alleged coer-
cion, the questioned person's "'will [was] overborne and his
capacity for self-determination critically impaired.'257
To be knowing and intelligent, "the waiver must have been
made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon
218 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966).
21 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1986) (citing, inter alia, Nix v. Wil-
liams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 & n.5 (1984)); State v. Santiago, 556 N.W.2d 687, 696-97
(Wis. 1996).
2" Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516
(1962)).
"' North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
252.id.
"' Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938).
21 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987).
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
26 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985).
27 Spring, 479 U.S. at 574 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602
(1961)).
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it." ' The suspect need not, however, "know and understand
every possible consequence" of waiving his rights.29 As long as a
person "knows that he may choose not to talk to law enforce-
ment officers, to talk only with counsel present, or to discon-
,260tinue talking at any time," then his waiver is knowing and
intelligent.
B. CULTURAL FACTORS IN THE VALIDITY OF MTRANDA WAIVER
Language and culture play a critical role in determining the
validity of a waiver. If a person does not understand his rights
due to language or cultural difficulties, or if his culture man-
dates that he comply with government authorities, then a
Miranda waiver may be suspect.
"[L] anguage difficulties may impair the ability of a person
in custody to waive these [Miranda] rights in a free and aware
manner."26' When an officer warns a suspect in the suspect's na-
tive language, the suspect's waiver is likely to be found valid.262
On the other hand, if an officer gives warnings only in English
to a suspect who does not understand English well, the waiver is
less likely to be valid.263  But language barriers do not always
Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421.
Spring, 479 U.S. at 574.26 Id.
2"' United States v. Alaouie, No. 90-1970, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18415, at *11 (6th
Cir. Aug. 1, 1991); United States v. Heredia-Fernandez, 756 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir.
1985) (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 749 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1984));
United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 1978); People v. Mejia-
Mendoza, 965 P.2d 777, 780 (Colo. 1998); State v. Santiago, 542 N.W.2d 466, 471
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
262 See United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Boon San Chong, 829 F.2d 1572, 1574 (11th Cir. 1987); Perri v. Director,
Dep't of Corrections, 817 F.2d 448, 453 (7th Cir. 1987); Gonzalez, 749 F.2d at 1335-36;
Valdez v. State, 900 P.2d 363, 372-75 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Leuthavone,
640 A.2d 515, 520 (R.I. 1994); State v. Teran, 862 P.2d 137, 139 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993). Of course, the defendant may still challenge the translation of the warning.
See, e.g., United States v. Higareda-Santa Cruz, 826 F. Supp. 355, 359-60 (D. Or. 1993);
United States v. Kim, 803 F. Supp. 352, 358 (D. Haw. 1992); United States v. Fung,
780 F. Supp. 115, 116-17 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). See also supra notes 170-71 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of the interaction of language and waiver, see also Ramirez
et al., supra note 247.
"s See, e.g., United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534, 537-38 (9th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Guay, 108 F.3d 545, 549 (4th Cir. 1997); Alaouie, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
18415, at *13; Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied 499
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render a waiver invalid.26 These determinations are made on a
case-by-case basis. The courts evaluate "what effort the officer
made to communicate, whether the defendant responded that
he understood his rights or ever indicated that he did not un-
derstand them, and what the defendant displayed in English
language skills. ''2e
In United States v. Alaouie, the court found that the Miranda
waiver of the defendant, a Lebanese citizen who did not under-
stand English well, was valid. 26 The court reasoned that the po-
lice officer "took special care to thoroughly explain" the rights
to the defendant, and the defendant responded in English that
he understood his rights.267 Additionally, at trial, the defendant
did not use an interpreter, and testified in English.
In United States v. Bernard S.,268 the court found a juvenile de-
fendant's waiver valid, despite his inability to read or write Eng-
lish, his occasional conversation in Apache with his mother and
one of the officers during the questioning, and his need for an
interpreter during trial.26 9 The court found the waiver valid be-
cause the defendant had studied English through the seventh
U.S. 949 (1991); United States v. Bernard S., 795 F.2d 749, 751-52 (9th Cir. 1986) (cit-
ing cases); United States v. Short, 790 F.2d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Vasiliavitchious, 919 F. Supp. 1113, 1118-19 (N.D. Ill. 1996); United States v. Gra-
nados, 846 F. Supp. 921, 923-24 (D. Kan. 1994); United States v. Lizardo-Acosta, No.
93-40030-02-SAC, 1994 WL 191862, at *7-*8 (D. Kan. Apr. 12, 1994); Higareda-Santa
Cruz, 826 F. Supp. at 359-60; United States v. Yong Bing-Gong, 594 F. Supp. 248, 256-
57 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); Liu v. State, 628 A.2d 1376, 1380 (Del. 1993); State v. Melendez,
No. 93-A-1795, 1994 WL 738489, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1994); Le v. State, 947
P.2d 535, 542 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); Marquez v. State, 890 P.2d 980, 985-86 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1995); State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 473 (Tenn. 1993); Solis v. State,
851 P.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (Wyo. 1993).
264 See, e.g., Campaneria, 891 F.2d at 1020; United States v. Alvarez, No. 1: 98-CR-1 10,
1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9107, at *11-*13 (W.D. Mich. 1999); United States v. De Yian,
No. 94 Cr. 719 (DLC), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10072, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 1995);
United States v. Pichhadze, No. 2: 95-CR-58-01, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19877, at *12
(D. Vt. Nov. 9, 1995).
... United States v. Granados, 846 F. Supp. 921, 924 (D. Kan. 1994). See, e.g., De
Yian, 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10072, at *8 (finding that although the defendant's pri-
mary language was Chinese, his comprehension of English was sufficient to allow him
to make a valid waiver).
26 Alaouie, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18415, at *13.
267 See id.
2" 795 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1986).
"' See id. at 752-53.
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grade, answered the agent's questions in English, and re-
sponded that he understood his rights after the interrogating
officer explained each of the Miranda rights in English. 0
On the other hand, in United States v. GaribayP the court
found the defendant's waiver invalid due to. the defendant's
English language difficulties and low I.Q. The court applied the
totality of circumstances test to determine the validity of the
waiver. Pursuant to that test, the court examined the following
factors: (1) whether the defendant had signed a waiver; (2)
whether he was advised of his rights in his native language; (3)
whether an interpreter assisted him during the interrogation;
and (4) whether he appeared to understand his rights.m
The court found that none of the factors were met here.25
The defendant did not sign a waiver2 4 He was advised of his
rights only in English.2 75 He was not advised of his rights in his
native language, SpanishY Despite the availability of interpret-
ers, no interpreter was provided to him. It was not clear that
he understood the government agent because the agent admit-
ted that he had to rephrase questions when the defendant ap-
peared confused278 Moreover, the government offered no
evidence that the agent explained or clarified each right for the
27o See id.; see also Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied 499 U.S. 949 (1991) (finding that despite the defendant's poor English, he mani-
fested a sufficient understanding of English to understand and waive his rights);
United States v. Abou-Saada, 785 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1986) (ruling that the defen-
dant's waiver was valid despite the fact that he was an alien with limited education);
United States v. Alvarez, 54 F. Supp. 2d 713, 716-17 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (concluding
the defendant's waiver was valid because the defendant appeared intelligent, had
previously experienced the American criminal justice system, and had testified that
the officer read him his rights and that he understood his rights); United States v.
Granados, 846 F. Supp. 921, 924-25 (D. Kan. 1994) (finding the defendant's waiver
valid because the officer "took special care to communicate in simple and direct lan-
guage and to discern if the defendant understood what the officer was saying").
27' 143 F.3d 534 (9th Cir. 1998).
"2 Id. at 538.
2" Id. at 538-39.







defendant.m Additionally, the defendant had no previous ex-
perience with the American criminal justice system, so there was
no evidence that he was familiar with his constitutional rights.8
Consequently, the court found that the Miranda waiver was inva-
lid and the defendant's statements should have been sup-
pressed.281
In United States v. Short,28 2 the court found that the defen-
dant's waiver was invalid because she spoke and understood
English poorly.5 Furthermore, the defendant was a West Ger-
man national who had only been in the United States for three
months when she was questioned, and lacked any knowledge of
the American criminal justice system. Despite the agents' testi-
mony that they had taken "special precautions" to explain the
Miranda warnings to the defendant and that she seemed to un-
derstand her rights, the court found that her poor comprehen-
sion of English and her ultimate need for an interpreter at trial
indicated that she did not understand her rights.2 4 The court
suppressed Ms. Short's confession and reversed her convic-
285don.
The suspect's familiarity with the American justice system is
another factor the courts weigh to determine whether a sus-




"2 790 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1986).
m Id. at 469.
2" Id.
"Id.
See, e.g, Garibay, 143 F.3d at 538; United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 964-66
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Short 790 F.2d at 469; Government of the Canal Zone v. Gomez, 566
F.2d 1289, 1292 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Fung, 780 F. Supp. 115, 116
(E.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v. Nakhoul, 596 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (D. Mass. 1984);
Peterson v. Alaska, 562 P.2d 1350, 1363 (Alaska 1977); People v. Jimenez, 863 P.2d
981, 983 (Colo. 1993) (en banc); Liu v. State, 628 A.2d 1376, 1381 (Del. 1993); Le v.
State, 947 P.2d 535, 543-44 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465,
473 (Tenn. 1993); cf. United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding
that previous encounters with criminal justice system supported finding of valid
waiver); State v. Montes, 667 P.2d 191, 195 (Ariz. 1983) (same); State v. Leuthavone,
640 A.2d 515, 520 (R.I. 1994) (rejecting the suggestion that police officers should
have disregarded the defendant's claim of comprehension of his rights due to his
unique cultural background and inexperience with the American legal system); Solis
[Vol. 90
CONFESSIONS AND CULTURE
age, mental deficiency, literacy, facility with the English lan-
guage, or level of education in determining the validity of a
waiver, it will also consider the suspect's alienage and lack of
familiarity with the American criminal system.2 8 7  The court,
however, does not demand that the suspect comprehend the
disadvantage of waiving his rights, but only that the suspect un-
derstands that he enjoys certain constitutional rights which he
abandons by waiving them.2l
Using this analysis, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed a lower court's ruling suppressing the defendant's state-
ments in United States v. Yunis.2 9 Before agents interrogated the
defendant, a Lebanese citizen, they orally advised him of his
Miranda rights in English and in Arabic, gave him a form which
set forth his Miranda rights in Arabic, and secured both an oral
and written waiver.20 In deciding that the defendant's waiver
was valid, the court rejected the argument that his lack of fa-
miliarity with the American justice system caused his waiver to
be unknowing.2? In the court's view, the precautions taken to
ensure that the defendant understood his Miranda rights out-
weighed the defendant's lack of familiarity with the American
legal system.
v. State, 851 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Wyo. 1993) (finding that previous encounters with
criminal justice system supported finding of valid waiver). For a discussion of this
case, see Phong T. Dinh, Criminal Law: Self-Incrimination Clause Requires that Suspects
Understand Plain Meaning of Miranda Rights Before Making Valid Waiver, 29 SUFFOLK U.
L. REv. 619 (1995).
21 See Yunis, 859 F.2d at 965; Nakhou 596 F. Supp. at 1402.
2" The court in Yunis stated:
[T]he focus must be on the plain meaning of the required warnings. A defendant must
comprehend, for example, that he really does not have to speak; he must recognize that
anything he says actually will be used by the state against him. But whether he fully appre-
ciates the beneficial impact on his defense that silence may have-whether he fully under-
stands the tactical advantage, in our system ofjustice, of not speaking-does not affect the
validity of his waiver.
Yunis, 859 F.2d at 964-65; see also United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1510
(10th Cir. 1990).
"' 859 F.2d at 965-66.
2W d.




Cultural heritage is another factor the court considers in
determining the validity of a suspect's waiver.2" To decide
whether the defendant's culture led him to waive his rights, the
court will examine the defendant's background and social and
work history to determine whether the defendant has main-
tained his prior culture or has been socialized into American
culture.
In Liu v. State, the defendant argued that his Chinese heri-
tage demanded "unquestioning cooperation with authority fig-
ures" leading him to "instinctively" relinquish his Miranda
rights.2 In evaluating the validity of the defendant's waiver, the
court found that although the defendant's cultural heritage was
a relevant factor to consider, it did not decide the issue. Assess-
ing the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that it
was not the defendant's Chinese background which mandated
his waiver. The court found it relevant that the defendant had
"lived and worked in New York City for several years" where he
had "obtained a taxicab license, conducted business and par-
ticipated in a small claims court proceeding."2' 5 Furthermore,
the defendant's "decision to stop answering questions during
the interrogation in a police dominated setting and his request
for an attorney" persuaded the court that the defendant under-
stood his rights and that his initial waiver was not due to his cul-
tural background.2
Additionally, courts examine whether the failure to provide
the defendant with an interpreter during the custodial interro-
gation rendered a waiver invalid. This consideration is particu-
larly relevant when the same defendant required the assistance
of an interpreter during court proceedings.f 7 Like other con-
"' See Liu v. State, 628 A.2d 1376, 1380-81 (Del. 1993).
2"Id. at 1380.
"' Id. at 1381.
2" Id. at 1381-82.
'7See United States v. Short, 790 F.2d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Lizardo-Acosta, No. 93-40030-02-SAC, 1994 WL 191862, at *8-*9 (D. Kan. Apr. 12,
1994). But see United States v. Bernard S., 795 F.2d 749, 752 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Granados, 846 F. Supp. 921, 925 (D. Kan. 1994); State v. Tran, 864 S.W.2d
465, 473 (Tenn. 1993); cf. United States v. Abou-Saada, 785 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1986)
(using fact that defendant answered questions before interpreter had interpreted
them as a factor in validity); State v. Nguyen, 832 P.2d 324, 327 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992)
[Vol. 90
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siderations, the courts blend this factor into the totality of the
circumstances test to determine whether the defendant's waiver
was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The courts examine
whether the suspect indicated in any manner that he did not
understand what the authorities were saying and whether he an-
swered their questions in English or another language.28
These cases demonstrate that it is not particularly onerous
for the Government to prove a valid waiver. Despite Miranda's
declaration that "a heavy burden rests on the government", to
prove the defendant's valid waiver of his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to counsel,3°° when the authorities
interrogate a suspect in the absence of the suspect's attorney,
the courts often find that the Government has sustained its bur-
den of proof. 01
Additionally, these fact-specific determinations make it dif-
ficult to predict how a court will evaluate a suspect's waiver.
While one court may view the suspect's language difficulties or
cultural heritage to be of paramount importance in deciding
(rejecting claim that defendant needed interpreter); Commonwealth v. Maldonado,
451 N.E.2d 1145, 1149 & n.4 (Mass. 1983) (noting infrequent use of interpreter as a
factor in finding of voluntary waiver).
"a Nguyen, 832 P.2d at 327. In United States v. Granados, the court found that the
failure to use an interpreter during the custodial interrogation of the defendant did
not render his waiver invalid. 846 F. Supp. 921, 925 (D. Kan. 1994). The court com-
pared the "complexity and breadth of what is typically done and said in the court-
room with what is involved in the Miranda warning," and concluded that "limited
English skills may suffice to understand the latter but not [the] former." Id. In State
v. Roman, the government had provided the suspect with an interpreter during the
questioning but the interpreter did not translate everything that was said. 616 A.2d
266, 269 (Conn. 1992). Although the court recognized that when a defendant does
not understand English, due process requires a continuous translation at trial, it was
not required to extend that ruling to the context of custodial interrogation. Id. at
270. Because the defendant understood English and rarely used the services of the
interpreter during trial, the court found that his rights to due process were not vio-
lated. Id On the other hand, dissenting AssociateJustice Berdon argued that the de-
fendant's waiver of rights during the custodial interrogation was invalid because his
deficiency in English rendered him unable to understand the questions posed to him
and to respond to them intelligently. Id. at 271-72.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
No Id.
" See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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the validity of a waiver,0 2 another court may minimize the sig-
nificance of these characteristics.0 3 This results in inconsistent
conclusions from different courts and makes it difficult for both
police and suspects to predict what factors will define the valid-
ity of a waiver.
IX. CONCLUSION
When the Court decided Miranda v. Arizona more than
thirty years ago, it could not foresee how profoundly the com-
position of American society would change in the coming years.
The Court could not predict that between the years 1969 to
1989, over 12 million people would legally immigrate to the
United States, °4 and that the majority of these immigrants,
rather than emanating from Europe, would come from Latin
America and Asia.305 The Court had no way of knowing that by
1990, 32 million people in the United States would report
speaking a language other than English in their homes3 6
So it is not surprising that in Miranda, the Court made little
mention of the defendant's cultural heritage and language
skills. Because the Court could not foresee the seachange in the
cultural landscape of the United States, factors such as culture
and language were not particularly relevant to the Court when it
decided Miranda.
But now that American society has experienced this cultural
transformation, courts throughout the country have been
forced, in their interpretation of Miranda, to confront such fac-
302 See United States v. Heredia-Fernandez, 756 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Alaouie, No. 90-1970 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18415, at *13 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 1, 1991); People v. Mejia-Mendoza, 965 P.2d 777, 780 (Colo. 1998); State
v. Santiago, 542 N.W.2d 466, 471 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); see also supra note 261 and ac-
companying text.
303 See, e.g., Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1020 (2d Cir. 1989); United States
v. Alvarez, 54 F. Supp. 2d 713, 716-17 (W.D. Mich. 1999); United States v. De Yian,
No. 94 Cr. 719 (DLC), 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10072, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United
States v. Pichhadze, No. 2: 95-CR-58-01, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19877, at *12 (D. Vt.
1995); see also supra note 264 and accompanying text.
304 SeeYANG, supra note 25, at 18; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
35 See UNGER, supra note 25, at 103; YANG, supra note 25, at 18; see also supra notes
46-47 and accompanying text.
-" See UNGER, supra note 25, at 103; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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tors as the defendant's cultural heritage, language skills, and
familiarity with the American criminal justice system. As this ar-
ticle demonstrates, the suspect's cultural heritage and language
abilities affect every facet of Miranda. From the definition of
custody to the evaluation of waiver, courts have considered
whether and how the defendant's culture should be factored
into the Miranda analysis. This article makes clear that with the
newly-populated American society, it is critically important for
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars to be sensitive to the roles
culture and language play in the interpretation of confession
law under Miranda v. Arizona.
48 FLORALYNNEINESMAN [Vol. 90
